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Abstract:
There are di­fferen­t mean­i­n­gs an­d fun­cti­on­s of what i­s called a “gen­eral pri­n­ci­ple of law.” 
Thi­s arti­cle seeks to address thei­r i­mportan­ce as the basi­s for the systemi­c i­n­tegrati­on­ of the 
i­n­tern­ati­on­al legal order. When­ i­n­tern­ati­on­al law i­s con­si­dered as a legal system, i­ts n­ormati­ve 
un­i­ty an­d completen­ess seems essen­ti­al. Thi­s arti­cle argues that gen­eral pri­n­ci­ples of law are a 
n­ecessary, although less vi­si­ble, elemen­t of i­n­tern­ati­on­al legal practi­ce an­d reason­i­n­g, whi­ch 
secure the systemi­c i­n­tegrati­on­ an­d lon­g­lasti­n­g un­derpi­n­n­i­n­gs of i­n­tern­ati­on­al law. In­ thi­s 
sen­se they may be seen­ as the gen­tle guardi­an­s of i­n­tern­ati­on­al law as a legal system.
Keywords: coherence of the legal order, completeness of the legal order, general prin-
ciples of law, international legal reasoning, sources of international law, systemic integra-
tion of international law
I. General principles of law (GPsL) are believed to be the most enigmatic sources of 
international law. That opinion is enhanced by the striking lack of a visible presence of 
GPsL in international practice, and consequently an absence of rights directly stemming 
from them.
GPsL are creatures similar to Dworkin’s stan­dards, i.e. pri­n­ci­ples and poli­ci­es, although 
the drafters of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) did 
not themselves consider them in this way. The principles concern rights, while the 
policies describe common aims. Both sets of standards – Dworkin argues – point to 
particular decisions about legal obligations in particular circumstances, but they differ in 
the character of the direction they give. Principles particularly differ from rules, as rules 
apply in “an all-or nothing fashion”, whereas principles have “the dimensions of weight 
and importance” and must be taken into account by decision makers as suggesting a 
given direction without necessitating a particular decision.1 Principles as such differ 
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from the legal rules that may be equally valid in given circumstances. It is interesting 
that the distinction between principles and rules had been known in international law 
scholarship prior to Dworkin’s Taki­n­g Ri­ghts Seri­ously. As early as in the 1950s, Gerald 
Fitzmaurice stated that “a rule answers the question ‘what’, a principle in effect answers 
the question ‘why’.”2 Indeed, principles address primary problems in legal reality and 
shape the ways in which rules act. regrettably, this has not been sufficiently taken into 
account by international courts and tribunals.
Legal reality is not passively experienced and researched by lawyers, including aca-
demia. They co-create this reality by their vocabulary, because language fulfils a crea-
tive function. Philip Allott claims it to be inherent in the nature of legal systems that 
writing and talking about the law may itself constitute law.3 Which is why the voca-
bulary matters. Indeed, “[…] the limits of the language (the language which I under-
stand) mean the limits of my world.”4 Perception, cognition, and understanding of 
reality is conditioned by the ideas and concepts in our language. Thus, the creative 
function of vocabulary seems to be beyond questioning. As far as international law is 
concerned, the recent broad debate about the constitutionalisation of international law 
has clearly proved this.5 During this debate the following issue has been prominently 
discussed: Is constitutionalisation a desirable and effective agenda for international 
law to be improved? I share the opinion that is supported by, among others, Bruno 
Simma6: If international law scholars want international law to be improved, they 
should underline its universalism and its systemic character based on such features as 
coherence, completeness and normative unity. The very nature of those features can 
cope with what is often considered to be a major threat to international law; namely the 
fragmentation of legal regulations and proliferation of judicial bodies. The first sentence 
that opens the Con­clusi­on­s of the Study Group of ILC on­ Fragmen­tati­on­ of In­tern­ati­on­al 
Law is worth repeating in this context: “International law is a legal system.” The next 
goes on to state that “[i]ts rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to and 
should be interpreted against the background of other rules and principles. As a legal 
system, international law is not a random collection of such norms. There are meaningful 
relationships between them.”7
2 G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples of In­tern­ati­on­al Law Con­si­dered from the Stan­dpoi­n­t of the 
Rule of Law, 92 recueil des cours 1 (1957-II), p. 7.
3 P. Allott, Lan­guage, Method an­d the Nature of In­tern­ati­on­al Law, 45 British yearbook of International 
Law 79 (1971), p. 118.
4 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logi­co­Phi­losophi­cus, Kegan Paul: 1922, p. 87, para. 5.62. 
5 See r. Kwiecień, In­tern­ati­on­al Con­sti­tuti­on­ali­sm, Lan­guage i­n­ Legal Di­scourse, an­d the Fun­cti­on­s of In­ter­
n­ati­on­al Law Scholarshi­p, in: A. Jakubowski, K. Wierczyńska (eds.), Fragmen­tati­on­ vs the Con­sti­tuti­on­ali­sa­
ti­on­ of In­tern­ati­on­al Law: A Practi­cal In­qui­ry, routledge, Abingdon/Oxon, New york: 2016, pp. 53 ff.
6 B. Simma, Un­i­versali­ty of In­tern­ati­on­al Law from the Perspecti­ve of a Practi­ti­on­er, 20 european Journal 
of International Law 268 (2009), p. 297.
7 International Law Commission, Con­clusi­on­s of the Work of the Study Group on­ the Fragmen­tati­on­ of 
In­tern­ati­on­al Law: Di­fficulti­es ari­si­n­g from the Di­versi­ficati­on­ an­d Expan­si­on­ of In­tern­ati­on­al Law, UN Doc. 
A/res/61/34, para. 1(1).
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These excerpts from the International Law Commission’s statement literally and 
substantively differentiate rules from principles, as did, e.g., Dworkin and Fitzmaurice. 
This article argues that it is GPsL that protect the systemic features of international law, 
and, consequently, its transparency and efficiency. Thus, GPsL are the guardians of the 
systematic character of international law. As such they provide international law with 
predictability.
II. The value judgments of scholars normally carry political implications even 
though, unlike States and intergovernmental organisations, scholars are not direct law-
makers. Thus, scholars may be seen as political actors, especially when their language 
is characterised by the phenomenon of reification, that is to say, turning conceptual 
entities into real things. This is visible when scholars’ aspirations are strongly motivated 
by political and moral aims.8 When the international legal language borrows from the 
moral and political discourse, the legal terminology absorbs some moral and political 
normativity. This is why the normative significance of the conceptual terms used in legal 
discourse turns not on the normativity of law as such, but rather on the normativity 
associated with the moral or political concepts drawn upon. It follows that the use of 
concepts as intermediate links in legal inferences may work to provoke reactions that 
international law itself and its main makers – States – cannot provoke. This is what is 
called “the normative functionality of conceptual terms in international law.”9
As stated above, there has been a striking lack of visible presence of GPsL in inter-
national judicial practice. On one hand, the general principles of private law have been 
treated by the PCIJ as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as sources of 
national, not international, law; and on the other hand the general principles of interna-
tional law have been rooted by the World Court in international customs and treaties.10 
The World Court and other courts and tribunals have not used, as yet, the potential 
of GPsL as meaningful instruments for judicial creativity and innovation, because 
they have, so far, used them “sparingly.”11 The hague Court in particular has not yet 
based any of its judgments on GPsL themselves, because it has denied their status 
as autonomous sources of legal obligations. The position of the good faith principle 
in its case-law is quite symptomatic of this point. In Border an­d Tran­sborder Armed 
8 J. Boyle, Ideals an­d Thi­n­gs: In­tern­ati­on­al Legal Scholarshi­p an­d the Pri­son­­house of Lan­guage, 26 harvard 
International Law Journal 327 (1985), pp. 349-351.
9 U. Linderfalk, The Fun­cti­on­ali­ty of Con­ceptual Terms i­n­ In­tern­ati­on­al Law an­d In­tern­ati­on­al Legal Di­s­
course, 6 european Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2013/2014), p. 37.
10 This approach has not been entirely shared by the International Law Commission. In Chapter VIII 
of its Report on­ the work of the si­xty­n­i­n­th sessi­on­ (2017) (A/72/10), the ILC states: “General principles of 
law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice can also 
serve as the basis for jus cogen­s norms of international law” (draft conclusion 5(3)). Nonetheless, the leading 
importance of customary international law is also underlined by the ILC, as follows: “Customary inter-
national law is the most common basis for the formation of jus cogen­s norms of international law” (draft 
conclusion 5(2)).
11 V. Lowe, In­tern­ati­on­al Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, p. 88.
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Acti­on­s it stated, following its Nuclear Test judgments: “The principle of good faith 
is, as the Court has observed, ‘one of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations’ […]; it is not in itself a source of obligation where 
none would otherwise exist.”12
One can ask what the above means. Could anything that “is not in itself a source 
of obligation” be a source of law? Secondly, is the function of GPsL governing the 
creation and performance of legal obligations only a subsidiary one or, in any case, 
less important than being a direct source of legal obligations? And a third question 
arises, namely whether the systemic integration function performed by GPsL is more 
important than the primary rules’ function? The answers to these questions are provided 
below. At this point it is just worth noting that herbert hart’s secon­dary rules (rules of 
change, of adjudication, and of recognition) cannot exist without pri­mary rules.13 At 
the same time, without secondary rules there is just chaos, not a legal system. It is GPsL 
that protect the systemic underpinnings of international law. They govern the creation 
and performance of the legal obligations flowing from primary rules, because they fulfil 
the systemic integration function. The latter is crucial for the legal reasoning that shapes 
legal practice.
III. Since the travaux préparatoi­res of Article 38 of the PCIJ Statute, there has been a 
dispute over the justification of the substantive nature of GPsL. The positivist position, 
defended then by elihu root in the Advisory Committee of Jurists, suggested that 
judges could only decide in accordance with the “recognised rules” and that, in their 
absence, they should pronounce a n­on­­li­quet. Besides, for root the principles of justice 
mentioned in the drafted Article 38 as “recognised by civilized nations” varied from 
country to country.14 edward Descamps, the President of the Committee, opposed 
root’s position and replied that this might be “partly true as to certain rules of secondary 
importance”, but “it is no longer true when it concerns the fundamental law of justice 
and injustice deeply engraved on the heart of every human being and which is given its 
highest and most authoritative expression in the legal conscience of civilised nations.”15 
Descamps and most jurists in the Committee also opposed the possibility of n­on­­li­quet, 
asserting that if neither conventional nor customary law existed, the judge ought then 
to apply general principles. Descamps strongly emphasised that “objective justice is 
the natural principle to be applied by the judge.”16 eventually, a clearly compromise 
12 ICJ, Border an­d Tran­sborder Armed Acti­on­s (Ni­caragua v. Hon­duras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgement, 20 December 1988, ICJ rep. 1988, p. 69, p. 105, para. 94. See also ICJ, Nuclear Test (Australi­a 
v. Fran­ce), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgement, 20 December 1974, ICJ rep. 1974, p. 253 p. 268, 
para. 46; Nuclear Test (New Zealan­d v. Fran­ce), ICJ rep. 1974, p. 457, p. 473, para. 49.
13 See h. hart, The Con­cept of Law (3rd ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford: 2012, pp. 91-97.
14 PCIJ/Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès­verbaux of the Proceedi­n­gs of the Commi­ttee (16 Jun­e­24 
July 1920) wi­th An­n­exes, The hague 1920, Ann. no. 3, point no. 3, p. 310.
15 Ibi­dem, pp. 310-311.
16 Ibi­dem, p. 323. For commentary, see B. Cheng, Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples of Law as Appli­ed by In­tern­ati­on­al 
Courts an­d Tri­bun­als, Stevens & Sons, London: 1953, pp. 6-22; A. Pellet, Arti­cle 38, in: A. Zimmermann 
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solution was reached by the Advisory Committee of Jurists between the supporters 
of Descamps’s position and root’s positivist outlook. This compromise was expressed 
in Article 38(3) of the PCIJ Statute and is now visible in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute.
Nonetheless, a dispute continues concerning the normative autonomy of GPsL. 
Legal positivists are mostly inclined to treat GPsL as incomplete international 
customs.17 On the other hand, both in scholarship and in the judiciary there is a starkly 
different approach to GPsL. Judge Cançado trindade’s views are representative of the 
autonomous position of GPsL. his reasoning, given in a separate opinion in the Pulp 
Mi­ll case, is worth quoting here:
The men­s legi­s of the expression ‘general principles of law’, as it appears in Article 38(1)(c) 
of the ICJ Statute, clearly indicates that those principles constitute a (formal) ‘source’ of 
international law, on their own, not necessarily to be subsumed under custom or treaties 
(…) [A] general principle of law is quite distinct from a rule of customary international 
law or a norm of conventional international law. A principle is not the same as a norm 
or a rule; these latter are inspired in the former and abide by them. A principle is not the 
same as a custom or conventional law.18
When the status of GPsL is taken into account, Judge trindade’s point of view 
is worth deliberating. I share his opinion that rules of customary and conventional 
international law are inspired by GPsL and abide by them. It follows that GPsL make 
up the constitutional background for the international legal order. however this raises 
the following question: Is there a difference between GPsL and what is known as general 
principles of international law? According to the ICJ, these latter are founded in customs 
and treaties,19 but despite that they remain “principles”, not rules. And yet another 
question: What is the ascertainment of the sources of GPsL within the international legal 
order? Is it based on substantive-law ascertainment criteria connected with the natural-
law approach? Or perhaps, a State consent, which constitutes a formal source of law, 
remains inevitable in this respect? hersch Lauterpacht’s legacy reflects the complexity 
of the issue. On the one hand, Lauterpacht did not entirely reject the positivistic 
justification of law, including the significance of State consent in international law, 
et al. (eds.), The Statute of the In­tern­ati­on­al Court of Justi­ce: A Commen­tary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2006, pp. 684 ff.; O. Spiermann, In­tern­ati­on­al Legal Argumen­t i­n­ the Perman­en­t Court of In­tern­ati­on­al 
Justi­ce. The Ri­se of the In­tern­ati­on­al Judi­ci­ary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pp. 57-62; 
r. yotova, Challen­ges i­n­ the Iden­ti­ficati­on­ of the “Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples of Law Recogn­i­zed by Ci­vi­li­zed Nati­on­s”: 
The Approach of the In­tern­ati­on­al Court, The University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
research Paper Series, Paper No. 38/2017, pp. 16-21.
17 E.g. G. Gaja (Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples of Law, in: Max Plan­ck En­cyclopaedi­a of Publi­c In­tern­ati­on­al Law, 
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law – Oxford University Press, 
2016 (on-line edition), para. 16) regards them as i­n­choate customs that do not require support in a State’s 
practice.
18 ICJ, Pulp Mi­lls on­ the Ri­ver Uruguay (Argen­ti­n­a v. Uruguay), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
trindade, 20 April 2010, ICJ rep. 2010, p. 135, 142, para. 17.
19 See supra note 12.
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but on the other hand he strongly argued that sources of international law, particularly 
GPsL themselves, follow the precepts of natural law.20
Within the problem of ascertainment of the sources of legal rules, GPsL seem to be the 
most ambiguous source. As already mentioned, Baron Descampes originally designated 
them as a measure against n­on­­li­quet that includes resort to natural law principles, 
before being subsequently re-constructed as an emanation of national traditions. Those 
traditions cannot be – according to him – ascertained in international law entirely on 
formal positivistic grounds, especially on State consent; a position which was later more 
broadly developed by hersch Lauterpacht.21 In this sense, the ascertainment of GPsL is 
“devoided of any formal character”, as claimed by a contemporary commentator.22
Indeed, the validity and legitimacy of GPsL are not grounded in State consent. In 
this sense, they need no formal ascertainment. It is rather the reverse that appears to 
be true; namely, the legal validity and the ascertainment of State consent and its nor-
mative effects come from some GPsL. This is why the latter are an essential factor in 
legal reasoning. GPsL, as similar to hart’s secon­dary rules, perform the ordering func-
tion among norms and confirm their validity. Thus, they support the coherence and 
completeness of international law independently of State consent.23 As Gerald Fitz-
maurice noted, it is not State consent but GPsL that are essential when a legal order is 
to perform its basic functions.24
The validation and legitimisation of legal rules are accomplished during their inter-
pretation and application, where logical reasoning and its quality is crucial. In particular 
legal language and its vocabulary, as underlined above, may have a causative influence 
on legal practice. So, the presence of GPsL in legal vocabulary and their meanings shape 
the legal reality, since the world of law – actually the human world – is governed by 
logical and mental regularities. In consequence, it is not GPsL that need State consent 
to be introduced and legitimate in international law, but rather the latter that needs 
GPsL to obtain normative validity and practical efficiency. Obviously this is the point 
of Kant’s critical philosophy’s origin, as well as of Kelsen’s Grun­dn­orm’s.
20 See especially h. Lauterpacht, Pri­vate Law Sources an­d An­alogi­es of In­tern­ati­on­al Law (wi­th Speci­al 
Referen­ce to In­tern­ati­on­al Arbi­trati­on­), Longmans, London: 1927; i­dem, The Fun­cti­on­ of Law i­n­ the In­tern­a­
ti­on­al Commun­i­ty, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1933.
21 See Lauterpacht (The Fun­cti­on­), supra note 20, pp. 60-84, where Lauterpacht stresses the crucial 
importance of the completeness of the legal system as a general principle of law.
22 J. d’Aspremont, Formali­sm an­d the Sources of In­tern­ati­on­al Law. A Theory of the Ascertai­n­men­t of 
Legal Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2011, p. 171.
23 See J.I. Charney, Un­i­versal In­tern­ati­on­al Law, 87 American Journal of International Law 529 (1993), 
pp. 535-536. See also the World Court’s judgments which support the independence of GPsL from State 
consent: PCIJ, Certai­n­ German­ In­terests i­n­ Poli­sh Upper Si­lesi­a (Merits), PCIJ Series 1926 A, No. 7, 
p. 42; PCIJ, Factory at Chorzów (Jurisdiction), PCIJ Series 1927 A, No. 9, p. 21; PCIJ, Factory at Chorzów 
(Clai­m for In­demn­i­ty) (Merits), PCIJ Series 1928A, No. 17, p. 29; ICJ, Reservati­on­s to the Con­ven­ti­on­ on­ 
the Preven­ti­on­ an­d Pun­i­shmen­t of the Cri­me of Gen­oci­de, Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951, ICJ rep. 1951, 
pp. 15, 23. 
24 Fitzmaurice, supra note 2, pp. 39-40.
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IV. The heterogeneous substantive and formal character of GPsL must be taken 
into account to indicate their functions in international law. They are marked by 
diverse features, which is responsible for their various normative and logical functions. 
Some of them may undoubtedly perform the role of Dworkin’s rules. That role can 
be attributed to the principles covered by Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, or the 
“general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” They can be directly applied 
by the Court, “whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it.” As is known, a long-standing controversy concerns 
their nature. Are they pri­vate law an­alogi­es or emanations of natural law? The former 
meaning is nowadays supported by Article 21(1)(c) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). It entitles the ICC to apply 
general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognised norms and standards.
Needless to say, under Article 21(1)(c) of the ICC Statute GPsL, firstly, do not follow 
from customs and treaties, and secondly their role comes down to filling in gaps. But the 
issue still remains open whether GPsL are just simplistic borrowings from national legal 
orders. In other words, are they a generalisation based on a comparison of norms from 
“civilised national legal orders”? If so, one should share the opinion that the principle 
of good faith makes up a crucial criterion for belonging to “civilised legal orders.”25 For 
this reason the principle of good faith should be seen as a fundamental constitutional 
principle of the law. At the same time, the application of national legal principles in the 
international legal order is effective when it is appropriate for international relations or 
when it works within the systemic specificity of international law.26
V. But it is not this kind of GPsL that is the most meaningful for the systemic 
integration function of international law. That key function in international legal 
reasoning is performed by the principles which built the “constructivist thinking” in 
legal argumentation.27 They are “intrinsic to the idea of law”28 or “principles of legal 
25 See M. Kałduński, Zasada dobrej wi­ary w prawi­e mi­ędzyn­arodowym [The principle of good faith in 
international law], C.h. Beck, Warszawa: 2017, pp. 68-88; r. Kolb, Pri­n­ci­ples as Sources of In­tern­ati­on­al 
Law (wi­th Speci­al Referen­ce to Good Fai­th), 53 Netherlands International Law review 1 (2006), p. 9; 
A. Kozłowski, Estoppel jako ogóln­a zasada prawa mi­ędzyn­arodowego [estoppel as a general principle of in-
ternational law], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław: 2009, p. 40; U. Linderfalk, What 
Are the Fun­cti­on­s of the Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples? Good Fai­th an­d In­tern­ati­on­al Legal Pragmati­cs, available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955648 (accessed 30 June 2018).
26 O. Schachter, In­tern­ati­on­al Law i­n­ Theory an­d Practi­se: Gen­eral Course i­n­ Publi­c In­tern­ati­on­al Law, 
Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht/Boston/London: 1991, p. 50.
27 M. Koskenniemi, Gen­eral Pri­n­ci­ples: Reflecti­on­s on­ Con­structi­vi­st Thi­n­ki­n­g i­n­ In­tern­ati­on­al Law, in: 
M. Koskenniemi (ed.), Sources of In­tern­ati­on­al Law, Ashgate Publishing, New york: 2000, p. 361.
28 Schachter, supra note 26, pp. 53-54.
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logic”, that is measures of legal reasoning leading to legal effects.29 Thus, they are essen-
tial elements of legal argumentation. Without them, what is labelled as legal logi­c is 
simply not possible.
The function performed by such principles consists in the justification of coherence, 
stability, and the efficiency of both substantive and procedural sources of international 
law, as well as the rights and obligations flowing from them. It is a purely rhetorical 
question whether the efficiency and stability of treaty and customary rights and 
obligations could exist without such principles, or actually meta-principles, as bon­a 
fides, pacta sun­t servan­da and estoppel. This is exactly the meaning represented in the ICJ’s 
reasoning when it spoke of the principle of good faith as “one of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligation.”30 These principles are 
neither rules nor vague ideas. They are rather norm-sources, which aim to develop the 
rules of constitutional importance.31 It is due to them that international law may be seen 
as a legal order. They are “gen­eri­c pri­n­ci­ples” which are to “systemise the interacting sub-
systems of society.”32 Therefore, GPsL, gently but meaningfully, serve as the guardians 
of the systematicity of norms within international law. They determine the relationships 
between norms as guidelines when international law is interpreted and applied, which 
supports both the codification process and the progressive development of international 
law. Their systemic integration function cannot be underestimated.
VI. If international law is to be seen as a legal system, then its coherence, complete- 
ness and normative unity seem decisive. These features of international law should 
be protected in the legal reasoning whereby the systemic integration of international 
law is achieved. The constructivist thinking of lawyers may make them invisible law-
makers. But this constructivist thinking is not possible without GPsL. Thus, GPsL, as 
the indispensable measures of action for the invisible law-makers, are n­olen­s volen­s the 
guardians of the systemic integration of international law. 
29 J. Pauwelyn, Con­fli­ct of Norms i­n­ Publi­c In­tern­ati­on­al Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
In­tern­ati­on­al Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2003, pp. 129-131.
30 See ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australi­a v. Fran­ce), p. 268, para. 46.
31 See Kolb, supra note 25, p. 9.
32 P. Allott, Eun­omi­a: New Order for a New World, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2001, pp. 167-168. 
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